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Dengan menggunakan data harian daripada firma-firma yang tersenarai di 
Papan Utama pasaran saham Malaysia untuk tempoh Januari 1988 sehingga 
Oktober 2002, kajian ini berusaha untuk melihat peramalan pulangan dari 
pasaran saham Malaysia. Secara lebih khusus, kajian ini berusaha untuk 
mengkaji sama ada pasaran saham Malaysia dapat diramal (pulangannya) 
dengan menggunakan maklumat harga yang lepas. Ada tiga peringkat yang 
terlibat dalam kajian ini. Pertama, kajian ini menyiasat kebarangkalian harga-
harga saham dengan menggunakan ujian nisbah varian. Kajian ini mendapati 
pulangan ke atas saham Malaysia tidak mengikut urutan rawak dalam jangka 
waktu pendek mahupun jangka waktu sederhana iaitu selama julat satu, dua 
dan tiga bulan. Dalam peringkat kedua, kajian ini meneliti kadar keuntungan 
kontrarian serta strategi-strategi momentum dengan menggunakan kaedah 
yang serupa dengan Jegadeesh dan Titman (1993). Kajian ini menunjukkan 
bahawa strategi kontrarian berhasil untuk jangka waktu pendek, iaitu satu 
bulan untuk “ranking” dan satu bulan juga untuk jangka waktu menguji 
strategi. Manakala, strategi momentum adalah lebih menguntungkan pada 
jangka waktu sederhana iaitu dua bulan untuk “ranking” dan pengujian 
strategi, juga tiga bulan untuk “ranking” dan tiga bulan untuk tempoh 
pengujian. Peringkat yang terakhir adalah meneliti ciri-ciri kesan kontrarian 
dan momentum, iaitu apakah faktor-faktor yang menetukan magnitud 
keuntungan kontrarian dan momentum. Ciri-ciri itu adalah saiz firma, nisbah 
B/M dan volum pusingganti dagangan, serta ciri-ciri bukan-firma seperti risiko 
pelbagaian masa, musim dan kitaran ekonomi. Kajian ini menemukan 
keuntungan kontrarian jangka pendek kekal menguntungkan walaupun 
selepas mengawal ciri-ciri bukan-firma, iaitu  risiko pelbagaian waktu, musim, 
dan kitaran ekonomi. Berkenaan dengan ciri-ciri firma, keuntungan kontrarian 
hanya muncul dalam firma saiz kecil dan yang memiliki saham yang lebih 
menonjol serta B/M yang tinggi, dan volum pusingganti dagangan yang 
 xiv
 xv
tinggi. Sementara itu, keuntungan momentum  adalah lebih menonjol untuk 
firma yang kecil, nisbah B/M rendah, pusingganti dagangan yang tinggi, serta 
keadaan ekonomi yang memberangsangkan. Keuntungan momentum akan 





Using daily data of firms listed on the Main Board of the Malaysian stock market 
for the period January 1988 through October 2002, this study looks at the 
predictability of returns in the Malaysian stock market. More specifically, the 
study attempts to investigate whether the Malaysian stock market is predictable 
using past or historical price information. There are three stages in this 
investigation. First, the study investigated the randomness of stock prices by 
using the variance ratio test. The study finds that the stock returns in the 
Malaysian stock market does not follow a random walk in the short and medium 
terms i.e. one-month, two-month and three-month intervals, respectively. In the 
second stage, the study examined the profitability of contrarian and momentum 
strategies by employing a strategy quite similar to Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). The study reveals that a contrarian strategy appears to work for the 
short-term, i.e., one-month ranking and one-month testing period strategy. 
Whereas, momentum strategies are profitable at the medium term i.e. for both 
two-month ranking and two-month testing periods, and three-month ranking and 
three-month testing periods. The last stage was to further investigate the 
characteristics of contrarian and momentum effect, namely what factors 
determine the magnitude of contrarian and momentum profits. These factors 
include firm characteristics such as firm size, book to market (B/M) ratio and 
trading volume turnover, and non firm-characteristics such as time varying risk, 
seasonality and business cycle. The study found that the short-term contrarian 
profits remain profitable even after controlling for non-firm characteristics i.e. 
time varying risk, seasonality and business cycle. With regards to firm 
characteristics, contrarian profits only exist in small size firms and are more 
pronounced for stocks with high B/M, and high trading volume turnover. 
Whereas, momentum profits are more pronounced for firms of smaller size, low 
B/M ratio, and high trading volume turnover, and during upturn economy. 





1.1 Research Background 
A test of return predictability has important implications for asset pricing and 
market efficiency theories. Under an efficient capital market, equity prices 
reflect currently available information and therefore one should not be able to 
predict future returns using historical price data. On the other hand, if returns 
are predictable, it could imply market inefficiency unless the predictable 
variation can be reconciled with equilibrium asset-pricing models.  
The theoretical support of the test for the predictability of security returns 
are based on the idea that security prices follow a random walk, whereby price 
changes cannot be predicted in an efficient market. A large body of empirical 
works has tested stock price randomness by using variance ratio test (VR). Lo 
and MacKinlay (1988) were the first to propose the variance ratio test to test for 
random walk, and argued that the variance ratio test was more powerful than 
the well-known Dickey-Fuller unit root and the Box-Pierce Q tests. This was 
supported by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). If the variance ratio is equal 
to one, it implies that the returns follow random a walk. Otherwise, the random 
walk hypothesis will be rejected. In addition, if the estimated variance ratio is 
less than one, it implies negative returns autocorrelation or mean reversion of 
returns. Alternatively, if the values are greater than one, it implies positive 
returns autocorrelation or mean aversion of returns. (Grieb & Reyes, 1999). 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Poterba and Summer (1988) studied 
equity returns in the US as well as 17 other countries, and found that there is 
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positive autocorrelation at medium horizon and negative autocorrelation over 
longer horizon using variance ratio test. 
In emerging markets, Urrutia (1995) employed the variance ratio test to 
investigate the random walk hypothesis for four Latin American equity markets, 
namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. His findings revealed that the 
random walk hypothesis could be rejected for the Latin American emerging 
markets. This result is in line with Claessen, Dasgupta and Glen (1993) who 
uncovered variance-ratios larger than one for emerging markets. 
Some recent studies in the Malaysian stock market to test random walk 
by employing variance-ratio test were conducted by Mat Nor, Ming and Hussin 
(2002) and Salim and Ali (2002). They showed that the Malaysian stock market 
did not follow random walk. 
When return autocorrelations are positive and statistically significant, 
investors could generate positive and significant profits by using the momentum 
strategy (Barberish, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Otherwise, if return 
autocorrelations are negative and statistically significant, investors could earn 
profits by using the contrarian strategy (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subramahnyam, 
1998). Thus, the variance ratio may also suggest that there exists profit 
opportunities for contrarian and momentum strategies (Pan, Liano, & Huang, 
2004). 
A contrarian strategy arranges stocks based on their performance over 
some previous period and suggests buying past losers and selling past 
winners. This strategy is based on the premise that the market overreacts to 
information. A momentum strategy makes an equivalent ranking but 
 2
recommends buying past winners and selling past losers. This is based on the 
premise that the market underreacts to information. 
The profitability of contrarian and momentum strategies has been tested 
in many equity markets. Contrarian strategies have been documented in the 
long-term and short-term periods for the UK, the US and other countries as 
well. One of the most important early test of contrarian strategy is by DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) in the US. They based their research on the evidence in 
experimental psychology studies, suggesting that most people overreact to 
unexpected and dramatic events. They tested whether the same thing occurs in 
the stock market. Their study points out that portfolio of prior extreme “losers” 
dramatically outperform prior extreme “winners” even if the latter are more 
risky. In other words, the work of DeBondt and Thaler found a long-horizon 
reversal in stock return. 
Profits generated by the long-term contrarian strategies are seen not 
only in the US market, but also in stock markets across the world such as the 
UK, the France, Germany, and Australia; (Clare & Thomas, 1995; Gaunt, 2000; 
Munt, Vasconcellos & Kish, 1999). There are also some studies that investigate 
the overreaction hypothesis in the securities of Pacific-Rim markets like Hong 
Kong and Malaysia (Ahmad & Hussain, 2001; and Kwok-Wah, 1999).  
Some evidence of contrarian strategies are also documented in the short 
term. For example, Howe (1986), using daily stocks returns data from CRSP 
tape, finds that the evidence is strongly consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis. Zarowin (1989) ranks common stocks according to their 
performance during a given month, and finds that in the subsequent month a 
portfolio of the past month losers outperforms a portfolio of the past month 
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winners.  Bowmen and Iverson (1998) find that the stock market significantly 
overreacts and the result is affected by risk, size, seasonality and bid-ask 
bounce. Schnusenberg and Madura (2001) investigate the short-term over-or 
underreaction of six U.S. stock market indexes and reveal that strong evidence 
of a stock market underreaction for winner but an overreaction for losers. 
With regards to the Malaysian stock market, Arifin and Power (1996) 
found some evidence of short-run overreaction in share price, particularly in the 
first two weeks after portfolio formation date. Hameed and Ting (2000) found 
that there is a relationship between the short-term contrarian profits and the 
level of trading activity. 
Subsequent studies of contrarian strategies have sought explanations 
for the return reversal. The followings are some of the explanations put forward 
in the literature: (i) overreaction  (DeBondt & Thaler 1985, 1987); (ii) the size 
effect (Zarowin 1990, Clare & Thomas, 1995; Dissainake, 1997); (iii) 
seasonality effects (Chopra, Lakanishok & Ritter, 1992); (iv); trading volume 
(Condrad, Hameed & Niden, 1994; and Hameed & Ting, 2000); (v) change in 
risk (Chan, 1988, Ball & Kothari,1989) and microstructure biases (Atkins  & Dyl, 
1990; and Conrad, Gultekin & Kaul, 1997); (vi) behavioral aspects (Barberis et 
al.,1998; Daniel et al., 2001) and (vii) failing to account for transaction costs 
required to implement the strategy (Conrad, Gultekin & Kaul , 1997). 
In contrast to contrarian studies, there are studies looking at the success 
of buying past winners and selling past losers. This so-called momentum 
strategy is the opposite of contrarian strategy described above. Jegadeesh and 
Titman’s study (1993) is among the earlies studies to test the momentum 
strategy. They documented significant positive returns when stocks are bought 
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and sold based on short-to medium-run historical returns.  They found that the 
6 x 6 momentum strategy (sixth-month ranking, sixth-month holding period) 
generates returns of about 1% per month. They documented that past winners 
on average continue to outperform past losers, so that there was momentum in 
stock prices. 
The evidence of momentum in stock prices over the medium terms is 
well accepted and supported for the developed market in the US. For instance, 
see Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996, 1999), Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002), Hong and Stein (1999), Moskowit and Grinblat (1999), O’Neal (2000), 
Lewellen (2002), Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) etc. Similar results are 
found on other stock markets outside the US as well; see for example, 
Schiereck, Debondt and Weber (1999), Rouwenshort (1998, 1999), Liu, Strong 
and Xu (1999), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000), Glaser and Weber (2001), 
Demir, Muthuswamy and Walter (2004), etc. However, these papers did not 
cover the same period of time and the methodologies used to detect 
momentum were not uniform. 
From previous studies, the source of the profit and the interpretation of 
the evidence are also widely debated. One of the theory that explains 
momentum effect is behavioral or non-risk based. They argue that momentum 
profits provide strong evidence of market inefficiency, and are due to stock 
price underreaction to information.  Some studies found that the source of profit 
is related to firm characteristics i.e. size (Chui, Titman & Wei, 2000; Hameed & 
Yuanto, 1999;), book to market ratio (Hong & Stein 1999; Lewellen, 2002), and 
trading volume turnover (Lee & Swaminathan, 2000; Rouwenhorst, 1999;). 
Another theory is provided by the efficient market supporters who argue that 
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risk is the main source of momentum profits (Chordia & Shivakumar, 2002; 
Conrad & Kaul; 1998; Grundy & Martin, 2000; Jegadeesh & Titman, 2001). 
 The success of contrarian and momentum strategies above could 
actually be a test of the weak form efficient market hypothesis. These 
strategies may imply that the markets are not efficient as future price are 
predictable by using past prices. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The evidence on return predictability is, as Fama (1991) notes, among the most 
controversial aspects of the debate on market efficiency. There has been a 
growing list of literature on whether these returns patterns reflect an improper 
response by market participants to information (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et 
al., 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999) or whether they can be explained by risk 
(Condrad & Kaul; 1998; Grundy & Martyn, 2001). According to the efficient 
market theory, investors cannot earn extra returns without bearing extra risk 
and that using information based on past stock prices does not help investors 
to earn extra returns. Therefore, momentum and contrarian strategies present a 
challenge to the efficient market theory in this perspective, i.e. by proving that 
abnormal returns could be earned by taking advantage of underreaction and 
overreaction of prices without bearing extra risk. 
The contrarian and momentum strategies have been investigated in 
many equity markets but relatively very few research studies of the strategies 
have been carried out in the context of emerging markets. However given the 
special characteristics of emerging capital markets, namely thin trading, low 
liquidity, possibly less informed and rational investors, and having low 
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correlation with other emerging markets and developed market, one would 
expect more return predictability in these markets (Harvey, 1995). He also 
concludes that emerging markets are less efficient than developed markets and 
that higher returns at lower risk can be obtained by incorporating emerging 
market stocks into investors’ portfolios. 
The central idea of the efficient market hypothesis is that information will 
unbiasedly and instantaneously be reflected into the prices of assets traded. 
This will require, among others, that the participants in the markets could obtain 
or get access to information costlessly, and that they know the implication of a 
piece of new information. Investors are equipped with basic investment 
knowledge so that they will make investment decisions rationally. Arguably, this 
is hardly very true in the case of the Malaysian stock market where the number 
of individual investors is significant. Stock Market Investment in Malaysia, a 
publication by the (former) KLSE, reported that individuals make up 83 % of 
investors in the Malaysian stock market (Ranawana, 2000). Arguably, many 
retail players here could base their investment on rumors and speculations, and 
some really follow what others are doing (herding). In addition, some 
characteristics of emerging market like the Malaysian stock market, such as 
their relative illiquidity, less regulation on disclosure, less investment 
publication, etc, will make it harder to achieve market efficiency (Campos, 
Newell & Willson, 2002; Freeman & Bartles, 2000). And given the argument 
that information dissemination is asymmetrical, some kind of misreaction to 
news events could be observed in the market. 
Based on the above scenario, it is therefore reasonable to believe that 
prices of stocks traded in the Malaysian stock market may not fully reflect their 
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true value. Hence, some degree of predictability should be possible. 
Furthermore, this study examines the predictability of daily returns by testing 
the random walk hypothesis, using variance ratio test (VR), and then tries to 
find the relation between the VR and the profitability of contrarian and 
momentum strategies in the Malaysia stock market. This study then examines 
whether these anomalies, i.e. contrarian and momentum effects, are rooted in 
investor behavior that can be explained by size, B/M ratio volume trading 
turnover, risk, business cycle and seasonality.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
This study tries to address the main issue of whether or not prices in the 
Malaysian stock market are predictable. Specifically, the study seeks to 
address the following questions: 
1. Are the Malaysian stock returns predictable by rejecting random walk 
and showing the variance ratio (VR) is not equal to one? 
2. Can the results of the VR<1 lead to the success of contrarian 
investment strategy? 
3. Can the results of the VR>1 lead to the success of momentum 
investment strategy? 
4. Are the magnitudes of contrarian profits due to firm characteristics i.e. 
size, Book to Market (B/M) ratio and trading volume turnover? 
5. Are the magnitudes of contrarian profits due to non-firm characteristics 
i.e. changes in risk, business cycle and seasonality? 
6. Are the magnitudes of momentum profits due to firm characteristics i.e. 
size, Book to Market (B/M) ratio and trading volume turnover? 
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7. Are the magnitudes of momentum profits due to non-firm characteristics 
i.e. changes in risk, business cycle and seasonality? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this research is to examine random walk and investigate 
contrarian and momentum strategies, and to identify the factors affecting the 
profitability of contrarian and momentum strategies in the Malaysian stock 
market. Specifically the objectives are as follows: 
1.  To examine whether price changes in the Malaysian stock market show 
evidence of randomness 
2. To investigate if the contrarian strategy works in the Malaysian stock 
market 
3. To investigate if the momentum strategy works in the Malaysian stock 
market 
4. To investigate the relationship between contrarian profits and firm 
characteristics i.e. size, B/M ratio and trading volume turnover 
5. To investigate the relationship between contrarian profits and non-firm 
characteristics i.e. changes in risk, business cycle and seasonality 
6. To investigate the relationship between momentum profits and firm 
characteristics i.e. size, B/M ratio and trading volume turnover 
7. To investigate the relationship between momentum profits and non-firm 





1.5 Significance and Contributions of the Study 
Studies testing randomness of prices are not new, even in Malaysia. However, 
most of the previous studies done in Malaysia concentrated on the more 
traditional methods such as serial correlation, runs test, unit roots, etc. A more 
recent, arguably more powerful test of variance ratio to be employed in this 
study has been used by Mat Nor et al., (2002) and Salim and Ali (2002). But 
the first only covers indices and the latter only uses monthly return data. This 
study will cover more comprehensive (individual stocks) and higher frequency 
data (daily returns), covering a longer study period. 
 More importantly, this study will look at one emerging area of research, 
which would contribute to the literature on stock market irregularities in the 
Malaysian stock market, i.e., the contrarian and momentum investment 
strategies. So far, no study has been done on the success of both contrarian 
and momentum trading strategies that simultaneously occur in this market, and 
analyzed comprehensively the relation between contrarian profits, momentum 
profits and factors which affect them in the Malaysian stock market. The result 
will provide further evidence to the ongoing debate on the source of the 
profitability of these strategies, and on the reemergence of return predictability 
studies. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
study, the problem statement, research questions, objectives of the study, 
scope of study and the significance and contribution of the study. Chapter 2 
focuses on a review of the related literature and previous research that are 
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relevant to the topic of the study. Chapter 3 presents the research framework 
and the hypotheses, which are constructed from the research problems 
formulated. The research methodology is described in Chapter 4. This includes 
the data and the method to be used in this study. Chapter 5 is devoted to the 
analyses and findings of the study. The descriptive statistics and the result of 
hypotheses testing are presented. In addition, a short summary of the 
hypotheses testing is given at the end of the chapter. Chapter 6 discusses the 
findings and provides the potential explanation of the findings. Chapter 7 
recapitulates the study by briefly reviewing the objective and the findings of 
study. The conclusions are then given. The limitations and the implications of 
study are presented too. The chapter ends with a suggestion of further 
research needed in this area. 
 
1.7 Definition of Terms 
Several terms are used extensively in this study.  For easy reference, their 
definitions are given below. 
1. Random walk - Random walk is as a theory that stock price changes 
from day to day are at random; the changes are independent of each 
other and have the same probability distribution. Many believers of the 
random walk theory believe that it is impossible to outperform the market 
consistently without taking additional risk (Fama, 1965). 
2. Autocorrelation – It is a correlation coefficient. However, instead of 
correlation between two different variables, the correlation is between 
two values of the same variable at times Xi and Xi+k. Where K is the 
amount of lag that is analyzed for autocorrelation (Gujarati, 1995). 
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3. Price reversal – This is a movement in a backward direction in the price 
or returns of a share from one period to the next (DeBondt & Thaler, 
1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
4. Price continuation – This is a continuing increase (or decrease) in the 
price or returns of a share from one period to the next (DeBondt & 
Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
5. Contrarian strategy – It is a trading strategy of buying past loser stocks 
and selling past winner stocks (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985). 
6. Momentum Strategy- It is a trading strategy of buying past winner stocks 
and selling past loser stocks (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
7. Winner stocks are stocks that have the highest returns within a certain 
study period (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
8. Loser stocks are stocks that have the lowest returns (DeBondt & Thaler, 
1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
9. Underreaction and overreaction are when prices respond to information 
or market events and do not adjust with the right intensity, either too little 
(underreaction) or too much (overreaction) (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; 
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
10. Ranking Period - the period over which the past returns are measured 
and ranked (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
11. Testing Period - the time period over which returns are calculated and 
analyzed (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993). 
12. Size or the market capitalization is the price times the number of shares 
outstanding (Hameed & Yuanto, 1999). 
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13. B/M is book-to-market ratio that is computed as the ratio of the book 
equity of a firm at the fiscal year-end that fall in year t-1 to the firm’s 
market capitalization at the end of December in year t-1 (Hameed & 
Yuanto, 1999). 
14. Trading volume turnover is measured as the number of shares traded on 
a particular day divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end 
of the day (Glaser & Weber, 2001; Hameed & Ting, 2000) 
15. Business Cycle is a period of time that provides a picture of the state of 
the economic activity by looking at variables like changes in the real 
Gross Domestic Product (Bacman, Dubois & Isakov, 2001).  
16. Time varying risk - generally means that risk are not constant and 
change over time (Chan, 1988). 
17. Behavioral Finance – the field of finance that proposes psychology-
based theories to explain stock market anomalies. Within behavioral 
finance it is assumed that the information structure and the 
characteristics of market participants systematically influence individuals' 




LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to have a better understanding of the related literature, this chapter will 
review the following: (1) random walk in share prices, (2) evidence of previous 
studies of contrarian strategies, (3) evidence of previous studies of momentum 
strategies,  (4) the efficient market hypothesis, (5) the behavioral models of 
overreaction and underreaction, (6) the psychological aspects in decision 
making, and (7) the profile of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
 
2.2 Random Walk in Share Prices 
Early ideas of random walk model date back to the year 1900. A random walk 
model suggests that there is no difference between the distribution of returns 
conditional on a given information structure and the unconditional distribution of 
returns. In other words, the random walk implies that stock returns must be 
independent over time and characterized by normal distribution (Megginson, 
1997). 
If stock prices are found to follow a random walk process then equity 
market is weak form efficient (Fama, 1970). In this is the case, all information 
contained in historical stock prices is fully reflected in current stock prices and 
so returns on share would not be predictable. Since future returns cannot be 
predicted from past returns, trading rules based on the examination of the 
sequence of past prices are worthless. Hence past information contains nothing 
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about the magnitude of the deviation of today’s returns from the expected 
return. 
Many studies examine whether stock returns are predictable from the 
past. One hypothesis widely tested is that stock prices follow random walk, 
which imply successive returns are independent. To ascertain the degree of 
random walk, traditional and current tests can be employed. The traditional test 
of weak-form efficiency is the autocorrelation test, which is a test of 
independence of price changes. The most-recent tests include a test of 
randomness in the direction of prices changes, the Box-Pierce Q test which is a 
test of average serial correlation structure, and the unit-root analysis. 
Since the work of Lo and MacKinlay (1988) the variance ratio test has 
been used widely as a test for the random-walk hypothesis. They demonstrated 
that the variance test is more powerful than the traditional tests that are 
mentioned above. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) employed variance-ratio test at 
various levels of frequencies and used the NYSE and the Amex stocks for the 
time period 1962-1985. They revealed that the random walk hypothesis in stock 
prices for weekly returns for both the entire sample period and all sub-periods 
for a variety of aggregate returns indexes and size sorted portfolios are 
rejected. They also found that portfolio returns exhibited significant positive first-
order autocorrelation or mean aversion. They argued that the presence of mean 
aversion for index returns is primarily due to the presence of small stocks that 
show a greater degree of mean aversion than large stocks. However, they 
found no evidence against the random walk hypothesis for monthly returns. 
Poterba and Summer (1988) showed that stock index returns might show 
positive autocorrelation if some of securities in the index trade infrequently. 
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They indicated that small stocks trade less frequently than larger stocks. 
Therefore, new information was incorporated first into larger stock prices and 
then into smaller stock prices with a lag. This lag induced a positive serial 
correlation. Jorge (1995), by employing variance-ratio test and using monthly 
prices, also suggested that stock returns of Latin American emerging market do 
not follow a normal distribution. In effect almost all of the variance-ratios are 
statistically and significantly larger than one as they increase with interval (q). 
The result also indicates that the rejection of the random walk process is due to 
autocorrelation and this evidence is in support of mean aversion in index 
returns. The result obtained by Urrutia (1995) for Latin American markets are 
consistent with random walk tests conducted for U.S securities by Lo and 
MacKinlay (1988) who find mean aversion for U.S. stock indexes. 
Grieb and Reyes (1999) reexamined the presence of random walk in 
stock prices in Brazil and Mexico by using variance ratio test on weekly stock 
returns for indexes as well as individual firms. They revealed that individual 
stock returns in Mexico are more heavily influenced by the positive 
autocorrelation or mean aversion behavior. In contrast, individual stock returns 
in Brazil are influenced by negative autocorrelation or mean reversion behavior. 
In the Malaysian stock market, some studies also employed the variance 
ratio test to investigate whether stock price follow a random walk or not. For 
example, Mat Nor et al.(2002), using twenty-three (23) years of daily data of 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index (KLSE CI) from 3rd January 
1977 to 31st December 1999, found that the random walk hypothesis was 
rejected under the assumption of homoscedasticity, particularly on a daily and 
weekly basis. Monthly index returns are only rejected at shorter lags. In 
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addition, their findings had been interpreted as evidence of mean aversion, 
rather than the mean reversion behavior of the market index.  Meanwhile, Salim 
and Ali (2002) investigated the random walk hypothesis by using weekly data 
for individual stock prices over the time span from May 9, 1997 to May 4, 2001. 
They used a total of 45 out of the possible 303 companies listed on the main 
board of KLSE and believed to be representative of their respective sectors. 
They showed that the random walk hypothesis was rejected for all of the stocks 
under the assumption of homoscedasticity. Furthermore, both studies show that 
there is positive return autocorrelation for KLSE and they reported that 
variance-ratios are larger than one.  
 
2.3 Evidence from Previous Studies on the Contrarian Strategy in Stock 
Market 
 
Contrarian strategy buys stocks that performed poorly (prior losers) over the 
past periods and sells short stocks that performed well in the same period (prior 
winners) and earn positive expected returns significantly in the subsequent 
period.  The notion of contrarian strategy over the long interval was conducted 
by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). In particular, companies which had 
earned poor returns in the past (losers) tended to improve their market 
performance while companies, which had performed remarkably well in the past 
(winners) tended to do less well in the future. Using monthly return data, as 
compiled by CRSP, for NYSE common stocks over the period 1926 to 1982, 
they formed two portfolios, consisting of 35 worst performing stocks (winners) 
based on the stocks’ market adjusted excess return over the past three years. 
This 3-year period is described as the formation or ranking period. The excess 
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returns in the subsequent 3-year period labeled the test period, are then 
calculated for both winners and losers portfolios. This process is repeated for 
sixteen non-overlapping 3-year period, starting January 1933. Their results 
show that the loser portfolio of 35 stocks outperformed the market by an 
average of 19.6 per cent in the 3-year after portfolio formation date. The winner 
portfolio, on the other hand, underperformed the market by more than 5.0 per 
cent. Thus, the difference in cumulative average residual returns between the 
two extreme portfolios equaled to 24.6 per cent. They also found that the 
excess returns in the 3-year test period was asymmetric, i.e. much larger for 
losers. Most of the winner loser effects occurred during the second and third 
years of the test period. The systematic price reversal patterns in the share 
return of the winning and losing firms, which are documented by DeBondt and 
Thaler may be inconsistent with an efficient market since investors can 
outperform the market using past share price information. In other words, stock 
returns may be predictable, and this may be due to excessive investor optimism 
and pessimism. They found evidence that US investors overreact to news. They 
applied their results based on a study of experimental psychology that has been 
pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1973). Kahneman and Tversky found 
that people tend to overreact to unexpected and dramatic events. Furthermore, 
DeBondt and Thaler interpret this evidence as a manifestation of the irrational 
behavior of market participants. 
 
2.3.1 Contrarian Profits and Firm Characteristics  
Zarowin (1990) found that the contrarian profits was not due to the overreaction 
hypothesis but due to the effect of size. Zarowin claims that loser firms are 
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smaller, i.e. losers tend to be smaller by the end of the 3-year formation period 
because their prices were getting lower. When both winner and loser groups are 
matched by size, all return discrepancies disappear, except in January. Zarowin 
also analyses the periods when losers are smaller than winner and periods 
when winners are smaller than losers. The result indicates that when losers are 
smaller, they outperform the winners. When winners are smaller they 
outperform the losers. Therefore, Zarowin concludes that the losers superior 
performance over the winners during the 3-year test period is due, not to 
overreaction, but to size discrepancies. Using UK data, Clare and Thomas 
(1995) provide evidence which is consistent with Zarowin’s conclusion that the 
difference in performance between the loser and winner portfolios is probably 
due to the size effect.  
However, Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) reexamined the 
DeBondt and Thaler findings. They investigated the stock returns of NYSE 
issues from 1926 to 1986 and incorporate size and betas in their multiple 
regression model. Their findings reassert the overreaction hypothesis; they 
found that loser portfolios formed on the basis of prior five-year returns 
outperformed winners by 5 percent per year during the subsequent five years. 
Their findings also provide larger arbitrage portfolio returns for smaller firms and 
contrarian profits cannot be explained by the differential risk. 
Assoe (2003) investigated the profitability of short-term contrarian in the 
Canadian Stock Market from January 1964 to December 1998, and found 
similar evidence as in the US market. Furthermore, he found that the contrarian 
investing was concentrated within the small firm groups. Chang, McLeavey and 
Rhee (1995), and Bowman and Iverson (1998) revealed empirical evidence on 
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the short-term contrarian profit respectively in the Japanese stock market and 
New Zealand stock market that continue to be profitable even after controlling 
for the firm size. Kang, Liu , and Ni (2002) analyzing the stock market in China, 
found significant contrarian profits and concluded that the sole source is an 
overreaction to firm specific information i.e. size. 
Brouwer, Put and Vels (1997) examined the overreaction hypothesis for 
the UK, France, and Germany based on several accounting ratios, such as 
book to market ratio. They found that high book to market past losers 
outperform that of past winners. This is in line with the result of Bildik and Gulay 
(2002) who revealed that the overreaction is significantly observed in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange for the period January 1991 to December 2000. They 
found that loser portfolios are typically smaller and have high book to market 
ratio than stocks in the winner portfolios. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) 
investigated B/M strategies for United States, Japan, and four European 
countries (France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). They 
revealed higher returns for higher B/M in relation to lower B/M stocks for all six 
countries. However, the difference in returns turned out to be only significant on 
a global level. An important result of their study is that in most cases, the higher 
B/M stocks had lower betas than the lower B/M.  Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) also provided evidence for the US which is higher B/M ratio 
(value stocks) outperformed lower B/M ratio (glamour stocks). They argued that 
investors overestimate the actual difference in future earning growth between 
glamour and value stocks. The consistent of higher B/M (value stocks) 
outperformed lower B/M ratio (growth stocks) that is also found in outside the 
US market.  Bauman, Conover and Miller (1999) examined ten years of 
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information in twenty-one international stock markets, which included the 
Malaysian stock market. They reveal that this difference between high B/M and 
low B/M stocks may reflect differences in investor behavior and accounting for 
Earning Per Share (EPS). 
There may also be a relationship between short-term contrarian profits 
and trading volume. For example, Conrad et al. (1994) revealed that the 
contrarian strategy is profitable only for securities that are heavily traded. 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), using daily and weekly prices, found that 
returns of portfolios containing high trading volume stocks led returns of 
portfolios comprised of low trading volume stocks. They indicated that this effect 
is related to the tendency of high volume stocks to respond rapidly and low 
volume stocks to respond slowly to marketwide information. 
With regards to the Malaysian stock market, Arifin and Power (1996) 
used weekly share price data that were obtained from Datastream for 47 
individual shares registered on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange over the 
period of January 1990 to December 1994. The companies in the sample were 
selected according to their market valuation as at May 30, 1995. They found 
some evidence of short-run overreaction in share price, particularly in the first 
two weeks after portfolio formation date. The trading strategy of buying a 
portfolio of underperforming shares and selling a portfolio of outperforming 
shares earns a significant profit.  Hameed and Ting (2000), using weekly price 
of KLSE stocks, find that there is a significant relation between short-horizon 
contrarian profits and trading volume. They document that portfolios of heavily 
and frequently traded securities tend to generate substantially higher contrarian 
profits than low trading volume portfolios. This is related to the tendency of high 
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volume stocks to respond rapidly and low volume stocks to respond slowly to 
marketwide information. 
 
2.3.2 Contrarian and Non-Firm Characteristics  
One possible explanation for the observed profits arising from the short-term 
contrarian strategy is the risk associated with undertaking the strategy. For 
example, Chan (1988) found only weak support for the overreaction hypothesis. 
He argues that stocks with a series of negative abnormal returns (losers) will 
experience an increase in their equity beta, and this increases their expected 
returns. This is because an equity beta is a function of gearing (i.e. the relative 
market values of debt and equity). With other factors remaining constant, a 
reduction in stock prices will lead to increased gearing and therefore, increased 
equity risk. Likewise, the winner stocks that experience a series of positive 
abnormal returns have their beta decreasing, and thus lower the expected 
returns. Therefore, the loser stocks, which experience a series of negative 
returns in the ranking periods, have their betas increasing and thus higher 
expected returns. 
Chan (1988) also criticized DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) work, which 
used arithmetic averages of returns for constructing their portfolio of winners 
and losers. In addition, the squared value of the arithmetic mean is equal to the 
squared value of geometric mean plus the variance of underlying random 
variable. That is, the geometric mean equals the arithmetic mean when there is 
zero variance or risk associated with them. By the very nature of a risky asset, 
the geometric mean estimate will be more reliable and conservative when 
compared to the arithmetic mean. 
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DeBondt and Thaler’s (1987) expansion of their earlier work, by adding a 
dummy variable in the regression model to capture the time-varying risk 
coefficient, found that the January effect is significant and there exist a strong 
correlation between price reversal patterns and the month of January. They also 
documented that neither risk differences between the loser and winner portfolio 
nor differences in size of companies comprising the loser and winner portfolio 
could account for the reversal behavior. 
Bowman and Iverson (1998), using weekly returns for the period 1967 
through 1986, examine the behavior of stock prices in New Zealand after a 
large weekly change in price and found that the stock market significantly 
overreacts in the short- run, especially in the case of price declines and 
significant reversals are confined to the following week They observed that the 
result is affected by risk, seasonality and bid-ask bounce. This is in line with the 
result of Conrad et al. (1997) who find a bid-ask bounce in transaction prices 
can explain much of the price reversal of short-term contrarian strategies. 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehman (1990) argue that the presence of the 
bid-ask bounce will induce reversal in observed returns of past winner and loser 
portfolios. As a result, any overreaction argument must either control for bid-ask 
bounce or present evidence of reversal of sufficient magnitude to exceed 
expected reversal induced by the bid-ask bias. Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehman 
(1990) find that even after controlling for the bid-ask bounce, short-term 
contrarian profits are statistically significant and economically meaningful. They 
suggest that the profits are due to inefficiencies in the market. 
Ahmad and Hussain (2001) investigate long-run overreaction that yield 
excess returns in the Malaysian stock exchange (KLSE) during 1986-96, and 
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also observe several factors which have been linked with the overreaction 
effect: firm size, time-varying risk, and seasonalities with regard to Chinese New 
Year Effect. They find that the result is consistent with the overreaction 
hypothesis that stocks in the best / worst performing decile experience a 
reversal of fortune in the following three years. 
There is recent empirical evidence that contrarian profits are related to 
business cycle, Cooper, Guetierrez, and Hameed  (2004) show that contrarian 
profits can be explained by macroeconomic variables that are common proxies 
for the state of the economy and find that contrarian profits exist only during 
downturn periods. 
 
2.4 Evidence from Previous Studies on Momentum Strategies 
There are some event studies, e.g. looking at long-term post event abnormal 
returns that suggest stock market under-reaction to information. The under-
reaction studies argue that stocks prices take a long time to respond to 
information. This is related to the study of momentum in stock returns which 
refers to the tendency for well-performing stocks to continue to perform well and 
for poor performers to continue to perform poorly after initial movement, in 
contrast to the overreaction hypothesis. 
A more specific consequence of under-reaction is the profitability of a 
momentum portfolio strategy, a strategy that exploits positive serial dependence 
in asset returns in particular. Momentum strategy is done by purchasing 
securities that have performed well in the past and selling of securities that have 
performed poorly. Buying the “winners” and selling the “losers” will earn positive 
expected profits in the presence of positive serial correlation because current 
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